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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal of in a domestic matter, brought by the father over a dispute over 
alleged medical expenses said to have been incurred on behalf of the parties' minor 
children. Melvin sought $26,589.93 in arrears by way of order to show cause on the 
scheduled day for trial. She alleges Mr. Baker had never complied to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-45-7.15 and 78-45-7.16 (1953, as amended). For Section 78-45-7.15 claim, this is an 
issue of first impression. The day care cost provision Section 78-45-716, had already 
been interpreted by this Court in Taylor v. Hansen. 958 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Mr. Baker presents two additional issues in this appeal that are intertwined ultimately 
affecting this Court's review of the judgment awarded - due process and the trial court 
judge's disqualification. Baker raises a question of plain error concerning the district 
court judge's obvious need for recusal - Baker feels mistreated over the judge's apparent 
fear of additional incompetency allegations previously made by Mrs. Melvin to the 
Governor, Jon Huntsman. Simply, put the allegation placed the judge in a lose-lose 
situation, he either would come across as reinforcing the truthfulness of the allegation by 
refusing to award Melvin 100% of her judgment request he risks looking overly willing to 
accommodate the request. 
Also, pursuant to the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, day care expenses 
and medical costs are all part of "child support." Melvin5 s December 1, 2005 order to 
show cause was barred by res judicata, claim precluded because walked into trial 
unprepared to address the issues there and instead opted to pursue an order to show cause. 
The issue is plain error. 
STATEMENT RELATED TO OTHER APPEALS 
Neither Melvin nor Baker have prior or related appeals concerning this matter. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (1953, 
as amended) (appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases . . . . ) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1) Whether Mrs. Melvin was equitably entitled to the entire judgment award of 
$27,124.85 covering a period from 1997 to 2005 for day care costs and medical 
expenses? 
Issue preserved: R. 704, T. 45 (concerning non-receipt of Mrs. Melvin's Exhibit 1 
to Affidavit. R. 595-664) 
2) Whether it was plain error for the court not to disqualify himself in light of 
Mrs. Melvin's April 19, 2005 letter to Jon Huntsman? 
Issue preserved: R. 405, T. 3-5. Notwithstanding, see plain error argument below. 
3) Whether Mrs. Melvin's judgment, in whole or in part, was barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata, having had several opportunities to raise arrearages, including the 
parties' December 1, 2005 bench trial where Mrs. Melvin instead delivered to the court a 
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motion for order to show cause? 
Issue preserved: See plain error argument below. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review a trial court' findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. Taylor 
v. Hansen. 958 P.2d 923, 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 
(Utah 1994). "'For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual 
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all 
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination.' Id. at 
935-36. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law which we review for 
correctness." Taylor (citing Gull Labs.. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 936 P.2d 1082, 
1084 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). 
In addition, in this matter, Baker raises two intertwined issues first time on appeal. 
Those issues are properly raised here because Mr. Baker invokes the plain error 
exception. Because the issues may be viewed as being raised for the first time on appeal, 
the Court must review the issue under a plain error standard. See State v. Ellifritz, 835 
P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) 
an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) 
the error is harmful. See State v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). 
The standard of review regarding questions of law, this Court accords no deference 
to the trial court and reviews the trial court's decisions for correctness. J.H. v. West 
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Valley City. 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992). 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS* 
U.S. Const., 5th Amend. U.S. Const., 14th Amend. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15 (2005) Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16 (2005). 
(* This provisions are reproduced in the attached Addendum C). 
STATEMENTS OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case; 
This is an appeal of a domestic relations matter from Third District Court in 
Tooele County concerning a money judgment awarded for alleged unpaid day care 
expenses and medical care costs allegedly incurred on the parties' minor children's 
behalf from 1997 to 2005. Mrs. Melvin is the custodial parent residing in Indiana and 
Mr. Baker is the noncustodial parent still mamtaining his residence in Tooele County, 
State of Utah after the parties divorced in 1994. On June 14, 2006, the Tooele District 
Court entered a judgment against Mr. Baker for a total sum of $27,124.85, 
representing allegedly unpaid day care arrears and medical cost reimbursements. 
II. Course of the Proceedings: 
On September 13, 1994, the parties filed for divorce. R. 6. A Decree of 
Divorce was entered on December 21, 1994. R. 41. An Amended Decree of Divorce 
was entered on March 8, 1995, prepared by Bruce Oliver. R. 50. On page 2, standard 
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day care and medical/dental provisions were addressed. R. 49. 
On February 28, 1996, a motion to set aside a post-decree order on order to 
show cause entered by the district court's default of Mr. Baker because of an 
accidental non-appearance. R. 11. On July 3, 1996, an Order Setting Aside Order on 
Order to Show Cause. R. 95. 
On September 23, 1996, a Motion for Order to Show Cause was filed on behalf 
Mr. Baker. R. 97. Ono September 29, 2004, counsel for Mrs. Melvin entered his 
appearance. K" T .^ Her attorney was Steven Kuhnhausen. < Mi (X u >brr 10, 1997, 
Mr. Baker filed another order to show cause addressing visitation interference. R. 127. 
An order to show cause was issued and a hearing was held on October 27, 1997. R. 
133. The parties stipulated to terms. Included therein was that Mr. Baker's half of 
day care expenses was $273 a month R 150. 
On November 4, 1997, Melvin filed a motion lor an order to show cause seeking 
judgement for both day care and medical expenses arrears. R. 137. She alleged 
$2436.00 in day care arrears. She alleges 459.50 in arrears for medical expenses. R. 
135. 
On NFovember 17, 1997, another order to show cause was filed against Melvin 
seeking visitation enforcement. R. 139. An order was entered on December 26, 1997 
concerning the October 27, 1997 hearing. R. 154. Paragraphs-10 set forth again a 
standard medical expense provision. Also, paragraph 11 mentioned that Baker was in 
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arrears for child care and proscribed that the parties' counsel would establish the 
correct amount and modify the court's order accordingly. R. 151. 
Nothing more was heard from either party for a year-and-a-half. Then on May 
10, 1999, the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services intervened. R. 161. The 
motion sought child support enforcement while Melvin was on State assistance. 
Nothing occurred on the record until 2004. 
On August 16, 2004, Baker filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause, pro se. R. 
174. He again raised non-compliance of the divorce decree regarding visitation. On 
September 9, 2004, the State entered a second motion seeking intervention. R. 181. 
On September 15, 2004, an order of intervention was granted by the Honorable Judge 
Skanchy. At that time, a Petition to Modify Support Order was filed on the same date. 
R. 194. On September 17, 2004, Mr. Baker submitted notice to the court of Melvin's 
non-appearance for mediation and requested another Order to Show Cause. R. 196. 
On September 20, 2004, an order to show cause was scheduled for October 4, 2004. 
R. 205. On October 13, 2004, Mr. Baker entered an Answer to the State's Petition to 
Modify Support Order. R. 210. Within the Answer, Mr. Baker conceded his child 
support had not increased for 10 years and stated he would agree to a child support 
increase "If raising her child support will somehow make her more willing to let me 
see and talk to my children, then do it." R. 210. 
At the hearing for the order to show cause held on November 15, 2004, Mr. 
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Baker was awarded his attorney's fees and the court noted Mrs. Melvin's non 
attendance to mediation. R.219. At the hearing, Mr. Baker was represented by 
counsel, Ronald Elton. On the Court's November 24, 2004, signed minutes entered 
on November 30, 2004, Judge Skanchy noted "the file indicates continuing and on-
going Orders to Show Cause filed against [Melvin] for visitation issues." He also 
indicates "[Baker] alleges substantial non-compliance with visitation by [Melvin] in his 
most recent order to show cause." With these finding, the Court directed the parties to 
submit arguments to address the issue whether the district court is an inconvenient 
forum. R. 224. Oral arguments were scheduled for February 24, 2005. On February 
23, 2005, Mrs. Melvin submitted a 142 page response. None of the documents 
submitted addressed issues concerning the children's medical care or day care. In 
stead, Mrs. Melvin focused of alleged criminal history of Mr. Baker and addressed 
allegations of domestic disputes. R. 381. The submission was provided by Mrs. 
Melvin's attorney, Steven Kuhnhausen. 
At the hearing conducted the next day, February 24, 2005, the State's attorney 
informed the court that automatic withholdings were in place. R. 382. Also, at that 
hearing the Court determined that no domestic violence had occurred and that the court 
would retain jurisdiction. R. 382. The State of Utah was present and represented by 
counsel, Jeff Hunt. 
On March 17, 2005, the court entered a signed Order on Order to Show Cause. 
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R. 389. That order reflected the minutes of the court, except for the issue of child 
support arrears. Following the entered of the order, Mrs. Melvin submitted notice to 
the court that she would be representing herself. R. 394. 
On April 6, 2005, the court entered findings and an order re: Jurisdiction. R. 
398. On April 19, 2005, the court entered a letter addressed to Mr. Baker and 
the Governor, John Huntsman. R. 405. That letter attacks the Office of Recovery 
Services and Judge Skanchy for incompetence. Mrs. Melvin writes, "Governor, this 
letter is provided to summarize in writing, the latest issue in decade-long string of 
outrageous experiences for me concerning this non-custodial parent. The gross 
negligence and across-the-board incompetence throughout the judicial, state agencies 
funded to ensure that children receive court-ordered support (sepcifically the 3rd District 
Court-Tooele Count, (sic) Office of Recovery Services, Utah Attorney General's 
Office representing (sic) for ORS)" R. 405. The letter was addressed to Mr. Baker at 
two addresses, the Cooley address and the Quirk address. It was also addressed to Jeff 
Hunt. 
On April 26, 2005, Mr. Baker's counsel, Elton, withdrew. 
On May 17, 2005, Mr. Baker filed another motion for order to show cause, 
addressing the Huntsman letter. R. 410. On that same date, an order to show cause 
issued. It was filed pro se. At the hearing, the State of Utah, Office of Recovery 
Services was represented by Benjamin Stoneman. R. 419. Mrs. Melvin was 
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represented by Kevin Sullivan. On June 6, 2005, Mr. Sullivan filed on behalf of Mrs. 
Melvin a motion to strike the order to show cause asserting that mediation had not been 
completed. On June 13, 2005 the order to show cause was continued. R. 428. 
ON AUGUST 10, 2005, BENJAMIN STONEMAN FOR THE STATE OF 
UTAH, OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, ENTERED A CERTIFICATE OF 
READINESS FOR TRIAL. R. 431. The next day, August 11, 2005, Mr. Sullivan 
withdrew representation for Mrs. Melvin. R. 433. On November 3, 2005, a Pretrial 
Settlement Conference was conducted. R. 436. The matters before the court were not 
resolved so a bench trial was set. Both Mrs. Melvin and Mr. Baker represented 
themselves, pro se. Mr. Stoneman was present and represented to the court that he 
received a call "from Kevin Sullivan [regarding] representing [Mrs. Melvin]. And at 
the hearing, Mrs. Melvin stated "she is appearing pro se' she didn't retain Mr. 
Sullivan." R. 437. The bench trial was set for December 1, 2005. 
At the December 1, 2005, bench trial. Mr. Stoneman appeared and represented 
that a partial agreement had been reached. Child support would be modified imputing 
$20.12 an hour for Mr. Baker's income and minimum wage for Mrs. Melvin. He also 
informed the court that the statutory language would be included for medical. R. 439. 
Much to Mr. Baker's surprise, Mr. Sullivan was also present and represented Mrs. 
Melvin. Mr. Sullivan entered into the trial with a motion for order to show cause and a 
supporting affidavit. R. 441, 668. This was in lieu of the trial. At that time, an Order 
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to Show Cause was scheduled for December 19, 2005. Mr. Baker accepted service of 
the order to show cause. 
ON JANUARY 17, 2006, THE DISTRICT COURT ENTERED ITS ORDER 
MODIFYING SUPPORT ORDER. R. 684. Incorporated at "Attachment A" standard 
language regarding medical care provisions. This is the fourth ordered to the parties of 
the need to exchange medical bill and proof of payment documentation. R. 682. On 
January 23, 2006, the court conducted the order to show cause. R. 695. On January 
24, 2006, Mr. Baker opposed the order to show cause. R. 704. At that OSC hearing, 
the court determined the matter was in controversy and therefore set an evidentiary 
hearing. R. 695. The hearing was set for April 11, 2006. 
On April 11th, the court conducted its evidentiary hearing. Trial Transcript - R. 
785. At that hearing, Jeffrey Charles Melvin testified and was cross examined, (T. 5-
42), Mr. Baker testified and was cross-examined, (T. 44-58), and his wife Tara Baker, 
testified and was cross-examined, (T. 59-70). Five exhibits were introduced and 
admitted. Exhibit 1, 2 and 3 were offered as part of Mrs. Melvin's affidavit, Exhibit 
4, a spreadsheet was received, and Exhibit 5, a dentist bill were received. After the 
parties' rested, the court took the matter under advisement and instructed the court to 
submit proposed findings. On April 29, 2006, the court received Mrs. Melvin's 
findings and on May 18, 2006, the findings were entered. R. 731. On June 14, 2006, 
the court entered an Order on Order to Show Cause with the judgment amount for day 
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care and medical expenses of $27,124.85. 
On July 11, 2006, Mr. Baker appealed. 
HI. Disposition in Trial Court: 
At the scheduled bench trial in this matter on December 1, 2005, the parties 
entered a partial settlement. The settlement included a child support increase and a 
[fourth] inclusion of standard medical cost provisions proscribed in Section 78-45-7.15. 
Mrs. Melvin appeared that day with counsel after having previously stating she was not 
represented. Counsel filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause and an affidavit 
purporting outstanding medical expenses and day care costs from 1997 to 2005. It was 
an unfair surprise for Mrs. Melvin to appear at trial, the opportunity at hand to resolve 
any and all claims only to seek special separate proceedings for an order to show cause. 
The court on April 11, 2006, held an evidentiary hearing on the OSC anyhow. 
Stemming from that hearing, in an inappropriate manner in violation of both Sections 
78-45-7.15 and 78-45-7.16 as interpreted by Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998), the court entered judgment against Mr. Baker for $27,124.85. R. 740. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS, 
In this matter, the parties were formerly married and have been divorced since A 
Decree of Divorce was entered on December 21, 1994. R. 41. An Amended Decree of Divorce 
was entered on March 8, 1995, prepared by Brace Oliver. R. 50. On page 2, standard day care 
and medical/dental provisions were addressed. R. 49. The parties have two minor children, 
Aaron Baker, a male, bom October 28, 1992 and Brittany Baker, a female, bom December 10, 
1993. R. 6. The children are presently 15 and 13 Vi years old, respectively. 
During the course of these proceedings, the parties have been in court a total of three 
Orders to Show Cause hearings, one hearing to determine inconvenient forum and a bench trial 
on the State's Petition Modifying Support Order. At none of these stages of this proceeding did 
Mrs. Melvin raise any claim for unpaid child care costs and medical expense reimbursement. 
The dates for these earlier hearings were 10/27/1997 (OSC), 11/15/2004 (OSC), 2/24/2005 (Oral 
Arguments), 6/06/2005 (OSC), and 12/01/2005 (Bench Trial). Mrs. Melvin had plenty of 
opportunity to raise her issues she did not raise until walking into the scheduled bench trial on 
December 1, 2005, represented by new counsel carrying a motion for order to show cause. The 
conduct of Mrs. Melvin was an ambush and unfair advantage of a party opponent. 
The allegations raised by Mrs. Melvin are that Mr. Baker owed outstanding medical 
expenses and day care costs to her. R. 667. She purports that Mr. Baker owes her $6,428.67 
regarding the December 26,1997. That alleged judgment amount is contrary to the record, R. 
154, where the December 26, 1997 order following Mrs. Melvin's hearing on October 27, 1997 
did not address an actual amount. In stead the order read that the parties through counsel were to 
set an amount based upon proper "verification." Then the parties were to submit an amended 
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order. That duty was never completed. R. 151. Meanwhile that same order required that when a 
parent incurred medical expenses, verification of the expenses were to be provided to the other 
parent within 30 days with that parent needing to make suitable payment within 30 days. R. 151. 
In the evidentiary hearing for Mrs. Melvin's December 1, 2005 filed OSC motion, Mrs. 
Melvin did not testify. Instead, her husband, Jeff Melvin only testified. He testified that 
"Exhibit 1" were monthly statements he purported sent to Mr. Baker. R. 595-664. All of them 
look similar in that they were all printed from the same printer. Mr. Melvin testified that he sent 
them to Mr. Melvin. He explained that the reason they all look similar was that he keeps no 
xerox copy and he only store's electronic records. T. 5-6. Mr. Baker denied ever receiving any 
monthly statements, T. 44-45, except as to the complete packet provided him by Mr. Sullivan. 
Mr. Melvin testified that Exhibit 2, R. 537-594, is the medical bills and insurance 
premiums that he purportedly sent to Mr. Baker. T. 11. This exhibit is marked from 1997 to 
2001. Mr. Melvin testified that Exhibit 3, R. 442-536, were additional medical bills sent to Mr. 
Baker from 2000 to 2005. T. 12. However, the Exhibit is marked 2002 to 2005. Mr. Melvin 
and Mrs. Melvin were married in December 1996 and they moved to Indiana in 2000. R. 378. 
Mr. Melvin claims that he "eventually" had to pay the out-of-pocket of all the medical 
and dental. T. 20. 
Mr. Melvin summarized that from reviewing his records, through December 1997, the 
child care, the insurance premium, his portion, and his portion of the out-of-pocket medical and 
dental expenses, that the total you're asking, or that Shannon is asking for is $27,124,35." 
It does not appear and there is no record showing that Mr. Baker was provided the 
opportunity to validate whether Mr. Baker was giving notice each month that those payments 
13 
were being made, even accepting Mr. Melvin's testimony that he had mailed monthly statements 
out to Mr. Baker. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. Melvin Was Not Entitled to a Judgment for Purported Unpaid Medical 
Care Expenses and Allegedly Unpaid Day Care Costs Said to Be Owed 
by Mr. Baker - the Judgement of $27,124.35 is Inequitable. 
In this matter, Melvin was not entitled to a judgment for purported unpaid day care 
costs and outstanding medical care expenses she sought reimbursement for from Mr. 
Baker. Mr. Baker denies ever receiving any monthly statements. Notwithstanding 
however, No evidence is provided that Mr. Baker was permitted to validate proof of 
payment. Mr. Melvin only testified that he eventually paid them himself. T. 20. Mr. 
Melvin claimed he presented to Mr. Baker court seemingly appearing monthly statements, 
these monthly statements deprived Mr. Baker the same opportunity to validate the 
existence of the debts incurred because they were not validated with proper 
documentation of a debt and proof of payment required in Section 78-45-7.15 and 78-45-
7.16. Moreover, the clear evidence demonstrated that the purported statements were 
actually faked for purposes of obtain a false judgment of $27,124.35. 
B. The Trial Court Judge was Obligated to Disqualify Himself. 
In this matter, the trial court judge should have recused himself from hearing 
Melvin's day care costs and medical expense reimbursement claim. Judge Skanchy 
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clearly should have realized the allegations about Judge Skanchy's competency raised to 
the Governor placed him is a perilous situation. Canon 3(E) requires a judge to disqualify 
himself if reasonably the judge's impartiality might be questioned. Here, as reasoned by 
Baker, the judge's impartiality is reasonably questioned. It was foreseeable that neither 
side could accept the outcome of the evidentiary hearing, especially when the decision is 
contrary to the law or is contrary to the clear evidence. Mr. Melvin did not testify that he 
provided to Mr. Baker proper verification of payment as he is entitled. Mrs. Melvin was 
certain to complain a second time to the Governor if Judge Skanchy ruled against her, and 
a favorable decision to Mrs. Melvin contrary to the clear evidence would appear to be the 
result of the judge's own motivation to avoid a second complaint. 
C. Melvin's Reimbursement Request is Untimely and Time-Barred by the 
Doctrine of Res Judicata. 
In this matter, Mrs. Melvin filed a reimbursement request for day care costs and 
medical expenses after having previous opportunities and waiving those opportunities. 
The judgment requests seems to be an afterthought. Mrs. Melvin asserts that Mr. Baker 
owed her his one-half of medical expenses from November 1997 to November 2005. R. 
441, The record indicates that Mrs. Melvin had appeared or was represented by counsel 
here and here in five different hearings before her December 1, 2005 motion for order to 
show cause. R. 441. She had appeared to three prior orders to show cause hearings, one 
oral arguments hearing, and a bench trial, never once raising the issues of child care and 
unpaid medical expenses. One hearing was a bench trial, on December 1, 2005, where 
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Mrs. Melvin was unprepared for trial and instead requested an order to show cause 
special setting. Not until passing all of those former opportunities did Mrs. Melvin assert 
her untimely and deficient reimbursement request. Seeking a judgment for this amount is 
prejudicial in and of itself, particularly in light of the clear language included in Sections 
78-45-7.15 and 78-45-7.16 is in violation of the law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE. THE JUDGMENT AWARD WAS ENTERED IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.15'S AND 78-45-7.16'S PLAIN LANGUAGE. 
In this matter, an Order to Show Cause for enforcement of out-of-pocket medical 
expense and day care costs provisions are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15 
(1953, as amended) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16 (1953, as amended). Mrs. 
Melvin raises those issues on December 1, 2005 as she walked into a scheduled bench 
trial. On appeal here are both challenges of the trial court's findings and as to legal 
conclusions of equitable principles incorporated in the Section at 78-45-7.15(6) (7) and 
(8), for Melvin's failures to comply with those provisions.1 
1
 A district court may enter "equitable order relating to the children, debts or 
obligations, and parties." See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1) (1953, as amended); Ball v. 
Peterson. 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1996). 
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(A) BAKER IS ENTITLED TO THE SAME EQUITABLE REVIEW OF 
VALIDATION OF DEBT AND PAYMENT AS MELVIN HAD. 
A review of the case law and of the annotations of the Utah Code reveals that the 
question before this Court is a matter of first impression concerning medical care 
expenses. Even a review of the two other states, New Hamshire and Maine who have 
also adopted versions of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, reveals that the 
question raised here concerning Section 78-45-7.15 have not been considered by an 
appellate court before. However, similar to this section, the daycare provision, Section 
78-45-7.16 has been interpreted by this Court before and is governing here and instructive 
as to Section 78-45-7.15. 
(1) BAKER IS ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS. 
In Taylor v. Hansen. 958 P.2d 923 (1998), this Court was asked to review the 
denial of an request for reimbursements for child care costs proscribed in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.16 (1953, as amended). In that matter, as alleged here, Taylor sought a 
judgment for alleged day care expenses she claimed she incurred while she was a student. 
While the district court found Taylor was a student, the Honorable Michael Allphin 
determined that the statute clearly required payment for those child care costs related to 
employment or education but added "it would seem inequitable that [Hansen] not at least 
be provided with some means by which hecan verify the fact that they were so incurred, 
and that they were in fact 'reasonable.'5' This Court agreed with Judge Allphin, stating 
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"Our review of the record persuades us there is ample support for such a finding. Hansen 
not at least be provided with the same means by which he can verify the fact they were so 
incurred that there were in fact reasonable." Id, at 930. 
Section 78-45-7.16 addressed in Taylor and Section 78-45-7.15 share similar 
language suggesting a similar outcome here result. Section 78-45-7.16 of the Utah Code 
provides: 
(2)(a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent shall begin paying his 
share . . . immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care expense . . . . 
(b)(i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, a parent who incurs child care 
expense shall provide written verification of the cost and identity of a child care 
provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a provider and thereafter on 
the request of the other parent. 
(3) A parent incurring child care expenses may be denied the right to receive credit 
for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent 
incurring the expenses fails to comply with Subsection (2)(b). 
Section 78-45-7.15 reads in pertinent part: 
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the minor 
children be provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost. 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs 
of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. 
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the premium 
actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be calculated by 
dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the policy 
and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case. 
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, 
incurred for the dependent children. 
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV 
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of 
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the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar 
year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of Recovery Services 
under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any 
change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the 
date he first knew or should have known of the change. 
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of 
the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of 
payment. 
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent incurring 
medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to 
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with 
Subsections (6) and (7). 
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In this matter, Baker disputed with competent evidence challenging that validity of 
Melvin's claims asserted. Melvin claims that she provided Baker monthly statements. T. 
6-7. Exhibit 1, R. 595-664, is the purported monthly statements. Mr. Baker denied 
receiving those statements. T. 44-45, 57-58, 61. Mr. Melvin testified that along with the 
monthly statements he provided Mr. Baker copies of the bills. Exhibit 2, R. 537-594 he 
claims are those bills. (Id.) Again, Mr. Baker denied receiving them. T. 44-45, 57-58, 
61. Mr. Melvin testified that he "eventually" paid them himself. T. 20. There is no 
evidence that proof of the payments were timely made known to Mr. Baker, in order to 
seek reimbursement. 
Moreover, the accuracy of Melvin's testimony is controversial for a variety of 
reasons. Baker demonstrated that all of the monthly statements while purporting to be 
monthly ongoing statements were all apparently generated for the purpose of the 
December 1, 2005 OSC motion. R. 702. Mr. Baker testified that he had no troubles 
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receiving his mail. T. 47-48. He also testified that he did receive a few bills from 
medical providers, such as a dentist bill, Exhibit 5, R. 696. T. 67. He explained her 
received that bill and he paid it. He stated that the only thing he would receive were 
EOBs from his insurance. T. 50. 
Further evidence demonstrating that the receipts were apparent backdates was the 
fact that various addresses indicated address changes at times before even the Bakers 
actually changed residence or gave notice of an address change. R. 701. Melvin's 
purported monthly statements were obviously "manufactured" by Melvin with intent to 
mislead the court and they were not adequately supported by competent evidence showing 
they were actually or reasonably incurred by invoice or bill statement, nor were they 
supported by proof of payment. Reimbursement claims need to be validated by cancelled 
check and/or receipt from that healthcare provider so that Baker has the same opportunity 
to verify the genuineness of Melvin's claims. The closest the Melvins come to 
demonstrating that proof of payment was ever even made is Mr. Melvin's testimony that 
he "eventually" had to pay them. T. 20. 
Just as this Court stated in Taylor, before the district court can award a judgment 
for arrears for day care costs and unpaid medical care reimbursements, the moving party 
must demonstrate actual payment, before she can seek reimbursement for the other 
parents' half. Here, Mr. Baker is entitled to the same equity of validation as held in 
Taylor. 
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(2) TIME BARRED BY PLAIN LANGUAGE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15, is codified with it's own time restrictions. Just as 
Section 78-45-7.16 have imposed constraints. Failure of either section to comply timely 
of validation, the moving party can be precluded from collecting reimbursements. Melvin 
does not purport compliance of either Sections 78-45-7.15 or 78-45-7.16, but she asserts 
Mr. Baker is strictly liable to her for allegedly violating 78-45-7.15 and 78-45-7.16. Mr. 
Melvin testified to providing Exhibits 1 and 2, monthly statements he generated and 
copies of bills. That purported disclosure even if true is insufficient to obtain a judgment 
for reimbursements.2 Even for arguments sake (whether this Court believes Mrs. Melvin, 
or not, about providing Mr. Baker with monthly statements),3 the fact is that validation on 
a monthly basis is required in subparts (6) and (7). The effect of Melvin's failure to 
comply with subparts (6) and (7) is sanctionable and or rejection of the claims asserted 
may result. Under subpart (8), the Section reads: 
A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost 
and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15 (8) (Supp. 2005). Mr. Melvin never did provide Mr. Baker 
proof of payment. He testified in the April 11, 2006 evidentiary hearing that he 
2
 Mr. Baker is also protected by Utah Code Ann. § 15-4-6.7 (1953, as amended). 
3
 However, this Court should reject Mrs. Melvin5 s allegations, because the truth is the 
purported monthly statements were never, ever provided to the Bakers as Melvin claims. The 
first statement was never prepared until December 2005, when the Bakers received their very 
first statement. 
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"eventually" paid them. T. 20. There is no evidence that he was informed timely to 
where Baker could validate the need to reimburse Melvin, especially for a total sum of 
$27,124.85. Based on these facts, the district court should have imposed sanctions 
against Mrs. Melvin as the district court had previously over her interference with Mr. 
Baker's parent-time. On November 15, 2004, Mrs. Melvin was sanctioned $400.00 and 
admonished for her parent-time interference and violation of the Decree of Divorce by 
her relocation without consent to Indiana. R. 387. 
(B) THE COURT'S FINDINGS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED IT DURING THE EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING. 
The appearance left as a result of these inconsistencies are addressed in both points 
following. It would appear that the judgment entered in this matter was not as a result of 
the evidence but was the result of the judge's intentions to restore Melvin's faith in him. 
Ignoring the evidence in order to restore Melvin's confidence in him in the effort to avoid 
a follow-up letter to the Governor is a violation of Baker's due process rights. Baker, as a 
party, enjoys the right to feel that he will be fairly treated in his judicial proceedings. 
Once the question was brought to the judge's attention, the judge should have disqualified 
himself. SeeT. 3-5. 
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POINT TWO. MELVIN'S JUDGMENT WAS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA, 
ISSUE PRECLUSION FOR SHE HAD A TRIAL OPPORTUNITY THE YEAR 
PRIOR AND WAIVED HER OPPORTUNITY TO PROCEED AT THAT TIME, 
THEREBY BARRING A SECOND OPPORTUNITY, THE EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING ON AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
The principles of res judicata apply fully in the context of divorce proceedings. 
Krambule v. Krambule. 994 P.2d 210, 214 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In Krambule. the 
Honorable Judge Davis reiterated the points that Baker wishes to make here in this 
matter: 
"Res judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion." Masters v. 
Worslev. 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). At issue here is the claim 
preclusion branch of res judicata. "Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of claims 
that have been fully litigated between the same parties, and also precludes claims 
which 'could and should have been litigated in the prior action, but were not 
raised.'" Id (quoting Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)) (emphasis added); see also Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 
303, 305 (Utah 1985) ("cWhen there has been an adjudication, it becomes res 
judicata as to those issues which were either tried and determined, or upon all 
issues which the party had a fair opportunity to present and have determined in the 
other proceeding.'") (citation omitted). 
Id. In this matter, the parties had a trial set for "all claims" on December 1, 2005, which 
included to alleged determine any judgments for arrears. R. 439. As this Court had 
determine, clearly the claim of "child support" was allegedly pending before the district 
court since the State filed its Petition to Modify Support Order, in September 2004. R. 
194. The State raised both issues of support and as to sharing out-of-pocket medical 
expenses. (Id). However, at that time nothing was ever provided to Mr. Baker nor 
asserted by Melvin to suggest an outstanding day care or medical cost or reimbursement 
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request existed. The Petition was only a boilerplate of provisions otherwise, except to 
increase Mrs. Melvin's base support amount - this language is typical for Office of 
Recovery Services' pleading as an intervenor. No specific amounts had been alleged by 
any one for day care or medical expenses despite five prior hearings and numerous 
motions and cross motions. There were hearings on 10/27/1997 (OSC), 11/15/2004 
(OSC), 2/24/2005 (Oral Arguments), 6/06/2005 (OSC), and a Bench Trial held on 
12/01/2005, where the parties stipulated to an increase of child support and a fifth ordered 
inclusion of a provision language relevant to Section 78-45-7.15. R. 684. 
However, given the fact that Melvin had a genuine trial opportunity and that the 
claim of "child support" had been raised, but forfeited in order to settle at that December 
12, 2005 trial, it is clear that waltzing into trial with a motion and affidavit for order to 
show cause seeking $27,124.85 in reimbursements of child care and medical expenses in 
grossly untimely. Based upon the fact that Mrs. Melvin missed five prior opportunities to 
address purported arrears for day care and medical expenses ranging from 1997 to 2005, 
such an attempt must be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
In the event this Court views Baker's res judicata claim as an issue raised for the 
first time on appeal, Baker asserts that this matter is proper under the plain error 
exception. To establish plain error, Baker must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. See 
State v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). One, the error did in fact occur, the claim 
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was raised on December 1, 2005, the day of scheduled trial. The parties appeared at the 
trial, and Melvin surprised Mr. Baker by arriving with counsel not previously disclosed. 
At that prior Pretrial settlement conference on November 3, 2005, Melvin appeared pro 
se. She stated to the court she was representing herself. The State's attorney, Mr. 
Stoneman, also stated that he received a call to the same effect from Mr. Sullivan, who 
had withdrawn as Melvin's counsel the day after the State certified Petition to Modify for 
trial. R. 431, 433. Present for that hearing was just Melvin, Baker and the State's 
attorney. Both Baker and Melvin, to reiterate, were without counsel. On the day of trial, 
December 1, 2005, the parties settled all of the State's claims, these claims included 
"child support." According to the Utah Civil Liability for Support Act, "child support" 
includes the out-of-pocket costs raised separately in Mrs. Melvin's Motion for Order to 
Show Cause, she filed the day of trial. R. 441. The trial was cancelled otherwise. After 
Mr. Baker retained Bruce Oliver and he responded to the Order to Show Cause by 
affidavit on January 24, 2006, R. 704, the court determined a controversy existed and 
therefore set another evidentiary hearing.4 This style of endless litigation is specifically 
what res judicata as a doctrine was created to guard against. Clearly and this is 
undisputed, the claim when raised by Melvin could have been raised years earlier, as with 
the frequency the parties filed and were heard in court, she was given the opportunity to 
address any and all her outstanding claims she felt she had well before the scheduled trial 
4
 A bench trial is an evidentiary hearing. 
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of December 1, 2005. Instead, Melvin waived her opportunities to pursue other issues 
such as to seek a different forum or to complain to the Governor. It is Baker's position 
that Mrs. Melvin was unprepared to conduct a trial on the issues of reimbursements for 
medical expenses or day care costs because such an ambush at trial would have violated 
Mr. Baker's due process for lack of notice otherwise. Mr. Baker asserts that his due 
process was violated anyhow because obtain a false judgment for $27,126.85 is a 
violation of due process when (1) the law was not followed and (2) when no equity is 
applied as proscribed by Section 30-3-5(1), by 78-45-7.15 and 78-45-7.16. 
Also, due process guarantees the feeling of fair treatment. Having been afforded 
no equity for an untimely and deficient notice of payment verification other than Mr. 
Melvin attesting he "eventually" paid the out-of-pocket debts the Melvins alleged Mr. 
Baker owed is insufficient to justify any judgment award. Baker's argument here is the 
same as raised in Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath. 341 U.S. 123, 178, 71 S. Ct. 624, 
95 L. Ed. 817 (1951) the feeling of fair treatment. In Carey v. Piphus. 435 U.S. 247, 98 
S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978), the Supreme Court reaffirmed McGrath that Due 
Process also guarantees that the additional protection of the "feeling of just treatment." 
Id., at 1051, 261. 
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POINT THREE. IN THIS MATTER, IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE JUDGE 
NOT TO DISQUALIFY HIMSELF UNDER DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS. 
When a party raises a question for the first time on appeal, the moving party must 
invoke the plain error exception. See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). To establish plain error, Baker must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. See State v. 
Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). Although, Baker raised the issue of the judge's 
disqualification before the lower court, T. 3-5, Baker himself did not move for Judge 
Skanchy to recuse himself. Therefore, in the event this Court looks upon the 
circumstances as though Mr. Baker did not actually raise the issue below he voluntarily 
treats it here as a plain error issue. 
Here, the three factors are present to invoke the plain error exception. One, an 
error did occur, the Judge plainly should have recused himself in light of Melvin's claims 
directed to the Governor against Judge Skanchy for incompetence. R. 405. During the 
evidentiary hearing, the judge offered Melvin the opportunity to move for his recusal and 
he expressed he would grant the motion if she were to move for his disqualification. T. 3-
5. The court's acknowledgment of the issue was sufficient to place himself on notice of 
the lose-lose situation that truly called for his disqualification. Either Melvin would be 
dissatisfied if she loses and then once again assert the Judge was incompetent, or worse, 
allegations that the judge retaliated against her for reporting him to the Governor. Either 
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that, or Mr. Baker if he loses, would feel that the judge's final judgment was influenced 
by his personal desire to avoid additional incompetency claims. 
Two, the court should have realized that his final judgment would ultimately be 
questioned regardless of the outcome. To award Mrs. Melvin a $27,124.85 judgment in 
clear violation of Sections 78-45-7.15 and 78-45-7.16 when (a) she had violated the plain 
language of the subparts (6) and (7) of 78-45-7.15 and (2)(b) of 78-45-7.16; (b) her 
purported monthly statements appear to be back-dated statements, (See Exhibit 1, R. 664) 
and (c) Mrs. Melvin's history of disregard of the Decree of Divorce and disregard for her 
children's and Mr. Baker's rights under the decree all lead a reasonable person to believe 
Mrs. Melvin was being "rewarded" for her persistent incorrigibleness. See R. 225. 
Three, the error of the court was truly harmful to Mr. Baker. He does not have 
$27,124.85. The $27,124.85 judgement was never a genuine outstanding debt owed for 
reimbursement in the manner proscribed by Sections 78-45-7.15 and 78-45-7.16 as the 
debts allegedly incurred and proof of payments were not provided to Baker with 30 days. 
Mr. Melvin testified that he "eventually" paid them. However, no evidence was 
presented at trial nor exists in the record that Mr. Baker was made aware that payments 
were made. The evidence before the district court reveals that the statements were never 
proper validated. See Taylor, supra. The purported monthly statements were not 
statutorily validated by proof of incurrence and proof of payment. Moreover, the 
purported statements were allegedly delivered to the Bakers' future address before even 
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they new of that future residential address change, demonstrating again that the purported 
statement were generated in order to obtain a false judgment. R. 701. Given the fact that 
Mr. Melvin had notice from Baker's affidavit of his defenses, Mr. Melvin testified in a 
manner prepared to defend against Mr. Baker's claim. Mr. Melvin asserted that he only 
kept electronic records, when asked to explain why all of the statements contained in 
Exhibit 1 were the same format and printed from the same printer. T. 10. 
(A) A PARTY UNDER DUE PROCESS IS ENTITLED TO FAIR 
TREATMENT. 
As stated above, a party has the Due Process right to feel fairly treated. In this 
matter, Mr. Baker has no reason to feel fairly treated. The judgment of $27,124.85 was 
done in violation of the law and no equity was applied for the inadequacies of the claims 
asserted, the timely of when claims were raised and how Mr. Melvin's testimony 
overruled both Mr. and Mrs. Baker's testimony of never receiving the monthly statements 
purportedly delivered to the Bakers. T. 44-45, 57-58, 61. 
(B) UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, THE JUDGE SHOULD 
HAVE REALIZED HIS DILEMMA AND RECUSE HIMSELF TO 
AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY. 
In this matter, the rare circumstances that Baker asserts exists here caused by 
Melvin's letter to the governor called for the judge to recuse himself in order to avoid the 
appearance of impartiality. Here, Baker asserts that the need was recusal was plain and 
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substantial, to the extent that one his due process was violated by the court when it 
permitted Melvin to walk into the courtroom on the day of trial, December 1, 2005, with 
her order to show cause and did not bar it as untimely sought. Two, he asserts that his 
due process of fair treatment, as explained by the Supreme Court in McGrath and Carey. 
The court is charged in these domestic relations cases with the authority to enter equitable 
order in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1) (1953, as amended) (A district court may enter 
"equitable order relating to the children, debts or obligations, and parties."); see also Ball 
v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (1996). 
Baker asserts that the judge violated Canon 3(E)(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Conduct. A party need not prove actual bias, but demonstrate that a reasonable person 
could perceive a bias existed. See, e.g., State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 611 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) (finding appearance of bias, yet refusing to grant new trial due to absence of 
actual bias under harmless error analysis), affd, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998). When a 
party can show "the [trial] judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned" pursuant 
to Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1), his disqualification would have been 
proper. "This standard set forth by the Code of Judicial Conduct should be given careful 
consideration by the trial judge. It may require recusal in instances where no actual bias 
is shown." State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988). Our supreme court has 
previously stated: "Obviously, actual bias need not be found to support disqualification. 
An appearance of bias or prejudice is sufficient for disqualification We note that 
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disqualification due to the appearance of bias or prejudice seems more amenable to 
prospective application." Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538, 
544 n.5 (Utah 1988). However, it is true that a judge must avoid hearing a case "in which 
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned" Baker is mindful that "no 
deduction of bias and prejudice may be made from adverse rulings by a judge." 46 Am. 
Jur. 2d Judges § 219 (1994). In other words, the mere fact that a judge decides a case 
against a party may not be considered in determining bias. In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 
P.2d 1152 (Utah 1997). In this case, however, we do not have mere adverse rulings to 
consider. In actuality, Baker's claim is supported by the court's failure to follow the law 
contrary to the clear testimony of Jeff Melvin that he only "eventually" paid purported 
unpaid daycare and out-of-pocket medical expenses. R. 20. Both Sections 78-45-7.15 
and 78-45-7.16 request the other parent be given the same equitable opportunity to timely 
confirm the validity of a debt and proof of payment. Nothing in this matter ever showed 
that Malvin proved payment. Melvin cannot be awarded a judgment of $27,124.85 for 
the period of 1997 to 2005 when he cannot show that when he made those payments or 
when he made those payments known to Mr. Baker. 
CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of $27,124.85 should be vacated and set 
aside as a matter of law. The trial court judge disregarded the plain equitable provisions 
of 78-45-7.15 and 78-45-7.16 into proper consideration. Subparts (6) and (7) of 78-45-
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7.15 and subpart (2)(b) of 78-45-7.16 requires proof of any incurred obligation for day 
care or medical expenses within 30 days of incurrence and they are obligated to provide 
proof of payment as well within 30 days. If clearly appears to Baker that the Melvin letter 
to the Governor impacted the judge's impartiality. Plain error occurred in that the trial 
judge should have voluntarily disqualified himself. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of 
February, 2007. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Respondent and Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHANNON MELVIN (BAKER), i 
Petitioner, 1 
vs. t 
STEPHEN J. BAKER, JR., i 
Respondent. i 
' ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
' Civil No. 944300280 
' Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
This matter came on for hearing on April 11, 2006 before the Honorable RANDALL N. 
SKANCHY, District Court Judge. Petitioner was not present and was represented by her attorney, 
KEVIN P. SULLIVAN. The Respondent was present and represented by counsel, D. BRUCE 
OLIVER. The court having heard the evidence presented and having reviewed the exhibits, having 
made its Findings of Fact, separately stated in writing, good cause appearing therefore, now makes 
the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Respondent, STEPHEN J. BAKER, JR., is in contempt for willfully refusing to pay his 
portion of the children's medical expenses, health and dental insurance premiums and work related 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 1 
, C J 
ZB^JL"!i- P 
MELVDsF (BAKER) VS. BAKER 
Civil No.: 944300280 
child care expenses. 
2. Petitioner is awarded a judgment from the Respondent in the sum of $27,124.85 as and 
for the children's medical expenses, the children's portion of the health and dental insurance 
premiums and the work related child care expenses through October 2005. 
3 . The Petitioner is awarded a judgment against the Respondent in the sum of $480.00 to pay 
for Petitioner's travel costs incurred attending the hearing on April 11,2006. 
4. That the Respondent is ordered to pay the Petitioner's attorney's fees. Petitioner's counsel 
shall submit Affidavit of Attorney's Fees to the court. 
\ t l i u NJU*c 
DATED this }T day o£»fck 2006. 
RANDALL N. SKANCHY, 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO RESPONDENT 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT: 
You will please take notice that pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, you 
have five days from the date of this Notice, plus three days for mailing to file a written objection to 
the proposed Order with the District Court Clerk. Failure to do so will result in the Order being 
signed by a District Court Judge. Govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this /ft day of May, 2006. 
SULLIVAN, 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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MELVTN (BAKER) VS. BAKER 
Civil No: 944300280 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 
ML 
day of May, 2006, a copy of the foregoing was served 
in the manner indicated below: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Attorney for Respondent 
180 South 300 West, #210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
y U.S. Mail Facsimile Hand Delivered 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
r~ r> f i o »-, 
KEVIN P. SULLIVAN, #3871 of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN, JENSEN, 
MEDSKER, CONKLIN, OLDS & NICHOLS, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Bamberger Square, Building 1 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5526 
Facsimile: (801) 392-4125 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHANNON MELVIN (BAKER), 





STEPHEN J. BAKER, JR., Civil No. 944300280 
/ Judge: Randall N. Skanchy 
Respondent. 
THIS matter came on for hearing on April 11,2006 before the Hon. Randall N. Skanchy, 
District Court Judge. The Petitioner was not present and was represented by her attorney, Kevin 
P. Sullivan. The Respondent was present and represented by counsel, D. Bruce Oliver. The 
Court having heard the evidence presented, and having reviewed exhibits, and being fully 
advised in the premises makes the following order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On December 26,1997, the Court ordered the Respondent, Stephen J. Baker Jr. to pay 
one half of all uncovered medical or dental expenses and-work-relaledxhild care expenses 
which the Petitioner incurred for the benefit of the minor children. 
2. The Petitioner was ordered to provide evidence of the expenses that she incurred through 
Third Judicial District 
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December 26,1997, and the Respondent was ordered to pay his share at the rate of $100 
per month. 
3. The Petitioner provided evidence to the Respondent that he was in arrears for uncovered 
medical and dental expenses and work related child care expenses through December 
1997 in the sum of $6,428.67. 
4. Paragraph 12 of the December 26,1997 order ordered the Respondent to pay $100 per 
month towards any amounts he owes for past child care expenses, medical expenses, and 
child support. 
5. The Respondent did not make a single payment towards the $6,428.67 that he owed as of 
December 26,1997 as ordered by the Court. 
6. The Respondent had been previously ordered to pay one half of the child care costs. In 
December 1997 the Court ordered that the Respondent's portion of the child care costs 
was $273 per month and he was ordered to pay it by the 10th day of each month. 
7. The Petitioner provided the Respondent with proof of the child care by mailing it to the 
Respondent's last known address. 
8. That through October 2005 the Respondent's one half of the children's portion of the 
work related child care is in arrears in the total of $12,193.00. 
9. The Respondent has not made a payment towards the $12,193.00 balance due on the child 
care. 
10. The Petitioner has provided the Respondent with verification of child care expenses and 
insurance coverage. 
11. The Petitioner provided verification by mailing the documents to the Respondent each 
month at his last known address since October 1997. Said billing statements were 
00730 
admitted as Exhibit 1. 
12. The Petitioner mailed copies of the verification of insurance coverage and copies of 
medical bills to the Respondent from 1997 through October 2005. Copies of the 
document were admitted as Exhibits 2 & 3. 
13. That through October 2005 the Respondent's one half of the out of pocket medical and 
dental expenses is in arrears in the total of $3,02543. 
14. That through October 2005 the Respondent's one half of the children's portion of the 
medical insurance premium is in arrears in the total of $5,477.25. 
15. The Petitioner and Respondent have discussed the debt over the phone on several 
occasions. 
16. The Respondent was aware of the debt, but the Respondent has denied ever receiving any 
mail from the Petitioner. 
17. The Respondent was aware that the children were being treated by doctors and dentists 
and knew that the Petitioner was providing insurance coverage. 
18. That the Respondent provided secondary insurance coverage for the children and had 
received documents in the mail from the health care providers. 
19. The Respondent received dental bills directly from the dentist and did not pay the bill. A 
copy of the bill was admitted as Exhibit 5. 
20. The Respondent's total obligation for the children's medical expenses, the children's 
portion of the health and dental insurance premiums, and the work related child care 
expenses through October 2005 is $27,124.85. 
21. That since December 1997 the Respondent has not made a single payment towards the 
children's medical expenses, the children's portion of the health and dental insurance 
n nnOQ 
premiums, or the work related child care expenses. 
22. The Respondent has been employed and has had the ability to pay his obligations and has 
willfully refused to do so. 
23. The Respondent is in contempt for willfiilly refusing to pay his portion of children's 
medical expenses, the children's portion of the health and dental insurance premiums, and 
the work related child care expenses. 
24. The Petitioner has had to retain the law firm of Farr, Kaufman, Sullivan, Jensen, 
Medsker, Conklin, Olds & Nichols L.L.C. to represent her in this matter and has incurred 
reasonable attorney fees. 
25. That the Respondent be ordered to pay the Petitioner's attorney fees. 
26. That the Petitioner resides in the state of Indiana and has incurred significant travel 
expenses because of Respondent's refusal to abide by the Court order. 
27. The Respondent be ordered to pay the Petitioner's expenses incurred in bringing this 
action including reasonable travel expenses. 
28. The Petitioner's travel costs for this hearing were $480.00 
DATED this \% day of M ^ . 2006. 
BY THE COURT, 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
/*-\ r\ »~* O 4*i 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certiiy that on the pjlpffl day of MQf>VJcr , 2006, a copy of the 
foregoing was served in the manner indicated below upon the following: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Attorney at Law 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Facsimile: (801) 595-0300 
- V U.S. Mail Facsimile Hand Delivered 
• C R E T A R Y C T _ 
ADDENDUM B 
BEN STONEMAN #10204 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff #4666 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
515 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0851 
Telephone: (801) 536-8368 
Fax: (801)536-8315 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHANNON T. BAKER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STEPHEN J. BAKER, JR., 
Respondent, 





Civil No. 944300280 
Judge Randall Skanchy 
This matter came before the Court for pretrial hearing on December 1, 2005, the 
Honorable Randall Skanchy, District Court Judge, presidmgTTHe Office of Recovery Services 
("Office") was represented by Ben Stoneman, Assistant Attorney General. Shannon T. Melvin 
formerly loiown as Shannon T. Baker ("mother") was present and represented by her attorney, 
'Jo 
*r_ 
Based on testimony and evidence presented and the Court being advised, now, therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED: 
The term "child" refers to the following child or children of ("respondent") and Shannon 
T. Melvin ("mother"): 
Name of child Date of birth 
October 28, 1992 Aaron J. Baker 
December 10,1993 Brittany Baker 
1. The Amended Decree of Divorce ("existing order") entered on or about March 8, 
1995, is modified in accordance with the terms of this order. 
2. The child support for the above-named children) shall be calculated imputing 
$20.12 per hour in earnings to the respondent ($11.75 for his wife's wage for present family 
credit) and imputing minimum wage to the petitioner. 
3. The parent(s) without physical custody shall pay the amount of support set forth in 
this paragraph. Beginning October, 2004, the respondent's child support obligation is $641.00 
per month, and the petitioner's child support obligation is $202.00 per month, based upon the 
respondent's gross monthly income of $3,496.86, and the petitioner's gross monthly income of 
$895.00. The support obligations continue through the end of the month the child becomes 18 
Shannon T. Baker vs. Stephen J. Baker, Jr., 
State of Utah, Intervenor 
Civil No. Tooele 
OFder Mollifying Support Ofder 
Page 2 
years of age, or tlirougftTKe e n ^ 
graduation from high school, whichever occurs later. When physical custody changes, the parent 
without physical custody shall pay as required above without the need to modify this order. This 
automatic change does not apply to situations involving joint or split custody or periods of court-
ordered parent-time. 
4. Immediate and automatic income withholding shall apply for the payment of child 
support. 
5. All child support payments shall be made to the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. 
Box 45011, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0011, unless the Office gives notice that payments 
should be sent elsewhere. 
6. The medical and dental expenses for the child, including the child's per capita 
share of the insurance premium, deductibles, copayments and all other reasonable and necessary 
uninsured expenses, shall be as set out on Attachment A. 
7. Written verification of insurance enrollment, medical and dental insurance 
premiums and any change in coverage or premiums shall be provided to the Office at 515 East 
100 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84114. 
8. Unless and until verification is provided to the Office, no credit will be given by 
the Office. 
Shannon T Baker vs Stephen J Baker, Jr, 
State of Utah, Intervenor 
Civil No Tooele 
Order Modifying Support Order pages nn&fin 
"97 The father "and m^a^Mrna^'lSoUfSctW5T5 East"F0TTSouth;~Salt7Ca]ce 
City, UT 84114 of any change in residence, employment, income or custody. 
10. Except as provided herein, the existing order remains unchanged. 
DATED this \7 day of M ^ ^ ^ V 200& 
BY THE COURT: 
RANDALL S K S C H Y 
District Court Judge 
ORS Case No. C000091800 
NOTICE TO PARTIES 
TO THE PARTIES ABOVE-NAMED: 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), this proposed Order will be filed with the Court five 
days after service upon you. Your objections, if any, must be filed with the Court within five 
days after service. 
Any party may request an adjustment of this child support order under subsections (8) and 
(9) of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 if there occurs a non-temporary, substantial change in 
circumstances OR if after three years there is a non-temporary difference of at least 10% 
between the amount ordered and the amount that would be required under the guidelines. 
Shannon T. Baker vs. Stephen J Baker, Jr., 
State of Utah, Intervener 
Civil No Tooele 
Order Modifying Support Order 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CSj;1 ' !7 
Shannon Melvm 
Stephen Baker 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
_(SOLE_CUSTOJ)XAND_PAI^RNITY) _ 
Civil No, ^ 3 0 0 2 ^ 0 
MOTHER FATHER COMBINED 
1. Enter the number of natural and adopted children of this mother and father for 
whom support is to be awarded. 
2a. Enter the mother's and father's gross monthly income. Refer to Instructions 
for definition of income. $895 00 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (Do not enter 
alimony ordered for this case). $0.00 $0.00 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations ordered for 
the children in Line 1). $0.00 $0.00 
2d. OPTIONAL. Enter the amount from Lme 12 of the Children in Present 
Home Worksheet for either parent. $0.00 $681.00 
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted Gross Income for 
child support purposes. $895.00 $2,815 86 $3,710 86 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Lme 3 and the number of children in Lme 1 
to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined Support Obligation Enter it here. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Lme 3 by the COMBINED 
adjusted monthly gross m Line 3. 24.00% 
6. Multiply Lme 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of the 
Base Support Obligation. $202.32 $640.68 
$843.00 
7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount(s) from Line 6 
or enter the amount(s) from the Low Income table per U.C.A. 78-45-7.7. The 
parent(s) without physical custody of the child(ren) pay(s) the amount(s) all 12 
months of the year. " 
$202 $641 
8. Which parent is the obligor? () Mother () Father ()Both 
9. Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in line 7? () Yes () No 
If NO, enter the amount(s) ordered: $ (Father) $ 
10. 
(Mother) and answer number 
10. What were the reasons stated by the court for the deviation? 
( ) Property settlement 
() excessive debts of the marriage 
() absence of need of the custodial parent 
() other: 
Attorney Bar No () Electronic Filing () Manual Filing 
onfisn 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 




FILLT u i ' _ 
WORKSHEET TO DETERMINE FATHER'S 




Other Parent's name: Tara 
FATHER OTHER COMBINED 
PARENT 
1. Enter the number of natural and adopted children of the father and the other 
parent. 
2a. Enter the father's and the other parent's gross monthly income. Refer to 
Instructions for definition of income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (Do not enter 
alimony ordered fo r this case). -
2c. Enter pre-existing ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations ordered 
for the children in this case). 
3. Subtract Lines 2b and 2c from 2a. This is the Adjusted Gross Income for 
child support purposes. 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of children in Line 1 
to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED 
adjusted monthlygross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of the 
Base Support Obligation. 
7. Enter the amount of the children's portion of the insurance premium actually 
paid. 
8. Enter the monthly work or training related child care expense for the children 
in Line 1. 
9. FATHER'S SHARE OF BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD FOR THE CHILDREN 
IN LINE 1. Enter the amount for the father from line 6. 
10. FATHER'S SHARE OF CHILDREN'S INSURANCE FOR THE CHILDREN IN 
LINE 1. Multiply Line 7 by .50, and enter the result here. 
11. FATHER'S SHARE OF WORK OR TRAINING RELATED CHILD CARE 
EXPENSES FOR THE CHILDREN IN LINE 1. Multiply Line 8 by .50, and enter the result 
here. 
12. FATHER'S SHARE OF TOTAL CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION TO THE 
CHILDREN IN LINE 1. Add lines 9,10, and 11. This amount may be used to adjust the 





^ A n n r\ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the /i> day of December, 2005, a copy of the foregoing Order 
Modifying Support Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Kevin Sullivan 
Attorney for Shannon T. Melvin 
Bamburger Square-Bldg 1 
205 - 26th St #34 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Stephen J. Baker, Jr. 
256 S Cooley St 
PO Box 265 




Shannon T Baker vs Stephen J Baker, Jr, 
State of Utah, Intervener 
Civil No Tooele 
Order Modifying Support Order 
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ATTACHMENT A 
Shannon T Baker vs Stephen J Baker, Jr, 
State of Utah, Intervenor 
Civil No Tooele 
Order Modifying Support Order- 0067' 
That the Petitioner shall maintain the primary health, dental and vision insurance 
coverage for the benefit of the minor children with deductible amounts and coverage equal to 
those in existence as of the date of this order as long as coverage is available through the 
insured's current or subsequent place of employment at a reasonable cost. The Petitioner shall 
provide verification of the coverage to the Respondent and shall also notify the Respondent of 
any change of insurance carrier, premium or benefits within 30 days from the date of that change. 
Each parent shall equally share the out of pocket costs for the premium paid for the 
children's portion of this insurance. This shall be calculated by dividing die premium amount by 
the number of persons covered under the policy, and multiplying the result by the number of 
children in this case. Each party is ordered to pay one half of any deductible or non covered 
amount for such essential medical or dental services or prescriptions related thereto that are not 
paid by the insurance provider, A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written 
verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of 
payment. The other parent is ordered to make their portion of the payment or make arrangements 
to do so within 30 days of receipt of the documentation supporting required participation 
The Respondent's spouse has a family insurance plan through her employment that can 
include the children of the parties and provide secondary insurance coverage for the children 
without any additional cost to the Respondent. As long as the Respondent's spouse's insurance 
coverage is in effect the parties shall cooperate in using the insurance as secondary coverage to 
supplement the Coverage of the Petitioner's insurance. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated sections 15-4-6.7, 30-2-5 and 30-3-5 (1 )(c). when a 
court order has been entered providing for payment of medical expenses of a minor child 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.5, a creditor who has been 
^ z-v s> M* n 
provided with a copy of the court order, may not make a claim for unpaid medical expenses 
against a parent who has paid in full that share of medical and dental expenses required to be 
paid under that Order.„ Accordingly, each-parent shall~(a) send ^ copy ofthe court Order 
referenced above to the creditor ofthe particular medical expense ofthe minor child; (b) notify 
the particular creditor ofthe parties' current address; (c) inform the particular creditor that they 
may not make a claim for unpaid medical expenses against that party if that party has paid in full 
that share ofthe medical and dental expenses required to be paid by that parent under the Order: 
and (d) inform the particular creditor that it may not make a negative credit report under section 
70(c)-7-107. or a report ofthe debtors repayment practices or credit history under Title 79 
Chapter 14. Credit Information Exchange, regarding the parent who has paid in full that share of 
the medical and dental expenses required to be paid by that parent under the court Order. 
ADDENDUM C 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amend. V 
Searches and seizures: validity of searches 
conducted as condition of entering public 
premises—state cases, 28 A.L.R.4th 1250. 
Sufficiency of description of business records 
under Fourth Amendment requirement of 
particularity in federal warrant authorizing 
search and seizure, 53 A.L.R. Fed. 679. 
Use of electronic sensing device to detect 
shoplifting as unconstitutional search and 
seizure, 10 A.L.R.4th 376. 
Use of trained dog to detect narcotics or 
drugs as unreasonable search in violation of 
Fourth Amendment, 150 A.L.R. Fed. 399. 
Validity of police roadblocks or checkpoints 
for purpose of discovery of alcoholic intoxi-
cation—Post-Sitz-cases, -74--A-L.R.5tk 319.-
Validity, under Federal Constitution, of 
search conducted as condition of entering 
public building, 53 A.LJL Fed. 888. 
Validity, under Fourth Amendment, of '-mail 
cover", 57 AX.R, Fed. 742. 
What circumstances fall within "inevitable 
discovery" exception to rule precluding ad-
mission, in criminal case, of evidence ob-
tained in violation of Federal Constitution, 
81A.LJLFed. 331. 
What constitutes "an opportunity for full and 
fair litigation" in state court precluding ha-
beas corpus review under 28 U.S.CA. sec. 
2254 in federal court of state prisoner's 
Fourth Amendment claims, 75 A.L.R. Fed. 
9. 
When is consent voluntarily given so as to 
justify search conducted on basis of that 
consent—Supreme Court cases, 148 A.L.R. 
Fed. 271. 
Forms 
22 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms 
(Rev), Searches and Seizures, Forms 1 et 
seq. (Requisites of Valid Warrant). 
22 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms 
(Rev), Searches and Seizures, Forms 51 et 
-seq-(Effect-of-lllegal-Search-and-*Sei2xire^in-
Criminal Proceeding). 
22 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms 
(Rev), Searches and Seizures, Forms 121 et 
seq. (Civil Liability for Wrongful Search 
and Seizure). 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
47 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 203, Admissibil-
ity and Reliability of Hair Sample Testing to 
Prove Illegal Drug Use. 
69 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Wrongful Death of Mi-
nor in Police Custody. 
Amendment V. Grand jury indictment for capital crimes; double jeopardy; 
self-incrimination; due process of law; just compensation, for property 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service--hr time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
Criminal Law <®=3411. 
Double Jeopardy <®=>21,51,131. 
Library References 
Westlaw Topic Nos. 110, 135H. 
C J.S. Criminal Law §§ 211, 213, 245. 
Research References 
ALR Library 
Acquittal or conviction in state court as bar to 
federal prosecution based on same act or 
transaction,- 18~A~LrR-Fed~393~-
Admissibility, in criminal case, of physical 
evidence obtained without consent by surgi-
cal removal from person's body, 41 
A.L.R.4th 60. 
Admissibility of evidence relating" to accused's 
attempt to commit suicide, 73 A.L.R.5th 
615. 
Admissibility of expert testimony regarding 
credibility of confession, 73 A.L.R.5th 581. 
Applicability of double jeopardy to juvenile 
—court=pf oceedingsr5 ~ATl^R74th~234~™—— 
Application, to drug or narcotic records main-
tained by druggist or physician, of "re-
quired records" exception to privilege 
against self-incrimination, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 
868. 
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Amend. XIII UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment XIII. Slavery abolished; enforcement 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment 
for crime whereof the party sliall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Section ~2. "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
Historical Notes 
Proposal and Ratification Louisiana, Feb. 17, 1865; Minnesota, Feb. 23, 
This amendment was proposed to the legisla- 1865; Wisconsin, Feb. 24, 1865; Vermont, Mar. 
tures of the several States by the Thirty-eighth 9, 1865; Tennessee, Apr. 7, 1865; Arkansas, 
Congress, on January 31, 1865, and was de- Apr. 14, 1865; Connecticut, May 4, 1865; New 
clared, in a proclamation of the Secretary of Hampshire, July 1, 1865; South Carolina, Nov. 
State, dated December 18, 1865, to have been 13; 1865; Alabama, Dec. 2, 1865; North Car-
ratified by the legislatures of twenty-seven of the
 o l i n a > D e c . 4> i 8 6 5 j ^ d Georgia, Dec. 6, 1865. 
thirty-six States. The States which ratified this _, _ . , - .
 r ,, . 0 i 
amendment, and the dates of ratification, are:
 fi The Legislatures of the foUowing States rati-
IUinois, -Feh^l, L865j Rhode Island, .Feb. 2, faed t h l s amendment after Dec. 6, 1865; Ore-
1865; Michigan, Feb. 2, 1865; Maryland, Feb. g° n ' Dec. 8, 1865; California, Dec. 19, 1865; 
3,1865; New York, Feb. 3, 1865; Pennsylvania, Florida, Dec. 28, 1865 (Florida again ratified on 
Feb. 3, T865; West Virginia,-Feb. 3, 1865; Mis- June 9, 1868, upon its adoption of a new consti-
sburi;Feb. 6," 1865; Maine, Feb. 7, 1865; Kan- tution); Iowa, Jan. 15, 1866; New Jersey, Jan. 
sas, Feb. 7, 1865; Massachusetts, Feb. 7, 1865; 23, 1866; Texas, Feb. 18, 1870, Delaware, Feb. 
Virginia, Feb. 9, 1865; Ohio, Feb. 10, 1865; 12, 1901; Kentucky, Mar. 18, 1976, and Missis-
Indiana, Feb. 13, 1865; Nevada, Feb. 16, 1865; sippi, Mar. 16, 1995. 
Library References 
Slaves ®=»24. C.J.S. Peonage §§ 3 to 5. 
Westlaw Topic No. 356. C.J.S. Slaves § 10, 
Research References 
ALR Library Purposeful inclusion of Negroes m grand or 
.Court.appointment of attorney to represent, petit jury as unconstitutional discrimination 
without compensation, indigent in civil ac- justifying relief in federal court, 4 A.L.R. 
tion, 52 A.L.R.4th 1063. Fed. 449. 
Amendment XIV. Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process; 
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of 
officers; public debt; enforcement 
~~" Section lT^MTpersons born "or iiaturalizeHTirtne United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
Stae^'RFpfeselitm^ 
34 
.UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amend. XIV 
-State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
liiliabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the propor-
tion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
-under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
.State, to support the Constitution of the United States-,- shall-have-engaged-in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to" the 
'enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
- Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States,- authorized by 
1
 law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
H
"in suppressing insurrection or'rebellion, shall" not be questioned. But* neither 
tEe United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
Historical Notes 
"
uProposal and Ratification thirty-six States. The amendment was ratified 
• '
r
 This amendment was proposed to the legisla- by the State Legislatures Vn the following "dates: 
tares of the several States by the Thiily-ninth Connecticut, June 25, 1866; New Hampshire, 
Congress, on June 13, 1866. On July 21, 1868, July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 19, 1866; New 
- Congress adopted and transmitted to the De- Jersey, Sept. 11, 1866; Oregon; Sept: 19, 1866; 
partment of State a concurrent resolution, de- Vermont, Oct '30, 1866; Ohio, Jan. 4, 1867; 
daring that "the legislatures of the States of ^ew York, Jan. 10, 1867; Kansas, Jan. 11, 
Connecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon,
 1 8 6 7 ; iUin0is, j a n . 15, 1867; West Virginia, 
Vermont, New York, Ohio Illinois, West Virgi-
 J a n > 1 6 ; 1 8 6 7 ; Michigan, Jan. 16, 1867; Minne-
ma, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana,
 s o t a J a n 16> 1 8 6 7 ; M a i n e > J a n 1 9 ; 1 8 6 ? ; Ne_ 
Minnesota, New Hampshire^Massachusetts, Ne-
 y a d a ? J a n u 1 8 6 ? ; I n d i a n a > J a n < 2 3 l g 6 7 ; 
braska Iowa, Arkansas, Florida, North Car-
 Missomit J a n . 25> 1 8 6 7 ; R ^ I s l a n d Feb< 7 
olina, Alabama, South Carolina, and Louisiana,
 1 Q,n TAr . ^ u n . Q,n „ , 
-i? - ' *u c ' i . r
 +u J 1867; Wisconsin, Feb. 7, 1867; Pennsylvania, 
being three-fourths and more or the several „ k 10 .0/.„ , , , _ ' i n J 1() ' 
States of the Union, have ratified the fourteenth * * ' l \ 1 ? 6 7 ; Massachusetts, Mar. 20 867; 
article of amendment to the Constitution of the Nebraska, June 15 1867; Iowa, Mar. 16, 1868; 
United States, duly proposed by two-thirds of Aransas, Apr. 6, 868; Flonda, June 9, 1868; 
each House of the Thirty-ninth Congress: North Carolina, Jdy 4, 1868; Louisiana, July 9, 
Therefore, Resolved, That said fourteenth article 1868 ' ' S o u t h Carolina, July 9, 1868; Alabama, 
"1i:hereby^ declared to be a-part-of tHe-C6r i s t im^- J ^4 3 ^4 8 6 ^ i - G e o x ^ a ' - J u L yi 2 i ' 1868.__Subse,_ 
tion of the United States, and it shall be duly q u e n t t o t h e proclamation" the following States 
promulgated as such by the Secretary of State." ratified this- amendment: Virginia, Oct. 8, 1869; 
•The Secretary of State accordingly issued a Mississippi, Jan. 17, 1870; Texas, Feb. 18, 
proclamation, dated July 28, 1868, declaring 1870; Delaware, Feb. 12, 1901; Maryland, Apr. 
that the proposed fourteenth amendment had 4, 1959; California, May 6, 1959; and Ken-
been ratified by the legislatures of thirty of the tucky, Mar. 18, 1976. 
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§c 7 8 - 4 5 - 7 . 1 5 . Medical expenses 
""'(I) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses' of the 
" lor children be provided^by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost. 
f (2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for 
^edical expenses, the court of administrative agehcyjmay consider the: 
(a) reasonableness of the cost; 
^ (b) availability of a group insurance policy;' 
(c) coverage of the policy; and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent. . 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share'equally the out-6Fpocket 
-osts of the premium actually paid by a parent Jos-the children's portion of 
~urance. 
(4) The parent who provides the insuranceT coverage may receive credit 
gainst the base child support award or recover the other parent's share of the 
Mldren's portion of the premium. In cases in which the parent does not have 
durance but another member of the parent's household provides insurance 
'coverage for the children, the parent may receive credit against the base child 
upport award or recover the other parent's share^otthe children's" portion o£ 
^premium. 
(5) The children's portion of the premium*-is1 a per capita share of the 
^emium actually paid. The premium expense3 for the children shall be 
t Gulated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered 
der the policy and multiplying the result by the number of children m the 
stant case. 
TC&) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and 
ecessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, 
"fcurred for. the dependent children. 
- I - '-»»-
(/} The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
yerage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title 
^pf the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial 
"ollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of 
5h. calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of 
covery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 F.&G. Section 
1 etJseq., of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits-Whin. 30 
endar days of the date he firsrknew'o^ should have Known of tBe cEange. 
(8) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written^ verification 
'ie-cost-atid-paymeri1fof medrcal-expenS^t^ 
$ payment. 
(9) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent 
curring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
723 
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expenses or to recover the other parent's share- of the expenses if"thatiparenj 
fails to comply with Subsections (,7) and (8). 
Laws' 1..9i4,lc. 118, § 16; Laws.1995, c. 258,5 14, eff.JVlay 1, 1995; Laws 2003, c. 176^P 
§ 17 ,"eEMay5;2003 . L ' ' """ 
~*j ^i>*»I3i Historical and Statutory, Notes , , ; ^ 
Laws 2003, c. 176, inserted a new subsec. (4). 
Cross References , ! r . . 
Debts, husband and wife, see § 30-2-5. ,<;;, ;. .!••••. . • v •.»*:•.:•..' 
Family support, duty of man, see § 78^-5-3. 
Family support, duty of woman, see § 78-45-4. :; -1 • ^ n ". ' * !" • 
Medical expenses of minor children, collection pursuant to order of child support, see §. 15-4-6..7SJ| 
' ^
 r
 Administrative Code References ~ v 
Child support, medical services, health insurance, see Utah Admin. Code 527-201. 
. Library References 
'Child S u p p o r t s 112. ^ '"""/'"'' '""' [.. ' 
WeWaw Key Number Search: 76Ekri2:i "''''"' 
^CiJvS. Parent and'Child §§ 171; 201fi i •-" > [ '''" - • 
J£01 
••>mm §: 78^-45—7.16;: Child care expenses—Expenses not incurred '* '-ii-".\; 
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent share'equally-ffil 
re^onable,work^elated^child:.cariei.expenses of the parents. ! ..;• •••-•5';' \.cj|jlii 
'(2)(a);cIf'ah;-actual^!experise^ri:child!bare'is incurred, a parent shallL;Beg^ 
paying; his share on a monthly basis;1immediately upbnprese pfbofi1®^ 
the child^care'expense/hut if-theKhiid'eare expense :ceases to be Mcurred3:l^p 
parent may suspend making monthly payment of that expense while it i s^n^p 
being,incurrgd, withont obtaining a rnodification of. the child support p n l | | | j j 
.;uri^)(iW^ court order;.to the-contraryy a parent whorineupl 
child care expense shall provide written verification ofathercost>and;idenl||i 
.of a child care provider, to the other parent, upon initial engagemeirt 'c^^ 
prpvidei^aiid ' .»*-:*_; -—a^||jgj* 
.'"";"''. (ii)'In the abseiic'e of a court order ..to the contrary/ the parent shall holnS 
P-:rffie-other-^ of child care -provider of the moptiSf^ 
.*•" e^k i se 'p f c£uldAcafe MtBin 30 calendar :days^ of ^ 
;. (3);jIn addition, to /any..other sanctions provided by the court/:, a ^ p a r ^ 
inclining-c^tLcare expenses .may be. denied, the,right to receive credit &5 C 
expenses,or to recover thejother parent's share-of the"..expenses if the.pareH 
incurring the expenses fails to comply with Subsection (2)(b). 
L a w s ' l ^ ^ . a ^ l ^ § 18;'Law^ l^C)^ c? 100^i2; Laws'l9$4Lc^l 18^§ iT. "' 
Library References 
!
'CHild^upport^l21V'' ' ';>-; •'••'- O. • i ' 0 ; ^ r : , - ,:.. 
^> tes t i aw^y^miber Search: -76Ekl2l( .. .:•». : - - ' _ C _ ^ 
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ADDENDUM D 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Respondent 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHANNON MELVIN (BAKER), ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) 
) Case No. 944300280 
STEPHEN J. BAKER, ) 
) Judge Mark S. Kouris 
Respondent. ) Commissioner Michelle C. Tack 
Comes now the Respondent, Stephen J. Baker, by and through counsel, D. Bruce 
Oliver, and hereby gives notice that he appeals the final judgment and order of the Third 
District Court by the Honorable Randall Skanchy for the above-named case number pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) (1953, as amended). This appeal is to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 10th day of July, 2006. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Respondent 
r^r, 
06 JUL i l Wi l -58 
RESPONDENT'S ADDRESS: 
P.O. Box 265 
Grantsville, Utah 84029 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
APPEAL, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Kevin P. Sullivan (801) 392-4125 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN, JENSEN, MEDSKER, 
NICHOLS, CONKLIN & PERKINS 
205 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Dated this 10th day of July, 2006. 
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